

Col. Glyn ; What effect did Isandlwana have on him?

By Cliff Holman

Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn was born 23 December 1831 in India. His father purchased a commission for him to enter the 82nd (Prince of Wales's Volunteers) Regiment later to become 2nd South Lancashires. Glyn served with the regiment in the Crimean War and in 1856 moved to India where the regiment assisted in quelling the Mutiny. Promoted captain in 1858, he purchased his majority in 1861 and in 1867 purchased the lieutenant colonelcy of 1/24th Regiment followed by promotion to full colonel in 1872. With Glyn commanding, the 1/24th was posted to South Africa in November 1875. In 1876, the 1/24th was sent to Kimberley due to reported unrest amongst diamond miners and concerns of politicians who did not want future economic prospects in the region put in jeopardy. The regiment marched seven hundred miles from the Cape to Kimberley in two months and their presence alone had the desired effect of 'nipping the problems in the bud'. No doubt to the chagrin of the troops they were immediately turned around and marched back to the Cape.

The 9th Cape Frontier War (known at the time as 'Kaffir Wars') broke out in 1877 and the 1/24th, with others, were despatched to the Transkei. Glyn was appointed commander of the force with the rank of colonel of the staff and Brevet Brigadier General. The regiment performed well receiving praise from the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, and Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of Cape Colony. Glyn was made a Companion of the Bath for his contribution in helping to end the Frontier War. During his time in the Eastern Cape, Glyn served with General Frederick Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford, who replaced General Cunynghame to command all troops in South Africa. At that time they apparently worked well together.

Glyn was an expert horseman who loved hunting and on this theme Lieutenant Nevill Coghill, a particular favourite of Glyn, wrote in his diary on 12 May 1876 that Glyn was: '.... affable in a reserved way' and 'The Colonel is good a little man as ever breathed has what amounts to monomania 'unting' being 'is obby'. (1)

Not all regarded him with affection however, and Glyn was described as:

'.... a short (5 feet 2 inches) grouchy officer inclined to need urging and forever at odds with his own officers and superiors'. (2)

Despite this, and putting aside any misgivings he may have had, Chelmsford appointed Glyn commander of No 3 (Centre) Column for the subsequent first invasion of Zululand. However, his feelings towards Glyn would change soon after this appointment. In late 1878 the 1/24th Regiment was despatched to Pietermaritzburg in Natal where Chelmsford was assembling part of the invasion force. Glyn had been accompanied to South Africa by his overbearing, strong minded wife – more will be heard of her later – and daughters. After saying his goodbyes Glyn took his regiment from Pietermaritzburg to Helpmekaar arriving on 30 November 1878. Although appointed commander of No 3 Column he was to have little real meaningful authority as Chelmsford, with his entire general staff, made the decision to join the column. In effect Glyn would play more of an administrative role with Chelmsford giving orders regarding movement and tactics once the invasion got under way. To a professional long serving soldier like Glyn, this must have been galling in the extreme and was no doubt the start of lowering his personal self-esteem. An early irritant to Glyn was Chelmsford ignoring his own standing orders instructing permanent camps and depots to be partly entrenched or protected by wagon laagers. Chelmsford's reasoning was his intention

not to stay long on the border and little substantial effort was made to adequately entrench Rorke's Drift or the camp established on the Zululand bank of the Buffalo (Mzinyathi) River after the invasion force crossed on 11 January 1879. Worse was to follow at Isandlwana.

Glyn knew few of the general staff attached to the column, including the man appointed as his Principal Staff Officer, Major Cornelius Clery. Clery was transferred from the staff of No 4 Column commanded by Colonel Sir Henry Evelyn Wood VC as Chelmsford believed he would counter some of Glyn's easy-going ways. Clery was unpopular and had a penchant for criticising senior officers especially if he considered they were not of the calibre of Wood. His initial impressions of Glyn were:

'... A guileless, unsuspecting man, very upright and truthful, yet a slow, not to say lethargic temperament'. (3)

Taking account of the command situation, and personalities involved, there was immediate tension between Chelmsford and Glyn's staff. The biggest problems manifested themselves between Clery and Chelmsford's Assistant Military Secretary, Lieutenant Colonel John North Crealock, 95th Regiment. Both men had similar personalities being sharp tongued and often displaying a complete lack of diplomacy with almost whoever they dealt with. Crealock's initial summing up of Colonel Glyn was:

'... do not expect anything (of him). He is a purely regimental officer with no ideas beyond it'. (4)

Clery's sarcastic response on the way Chelmsford's staff dealt with those of Glyn was equally scathing:

'Colonel Glyn and his staff were allowed to work the details – posting the guards, etc and all the interesting work of that kind. He (Glyn) was scarcely even seen or heard of the more so as he got anything but encouragement to interest himself in what was going on'. (5)

This attempted 'point scoring' did not bode well for the efficient and harmonious administration and running of No 3 Column. Coupled with this Chelmsford took little notice of suggestions from Glyn and had basically dismissed his observation that Helpmekaar should have been fortified as well as Rorke's Drift. As a result of these brush-offs Glyn retreated into his shell as it became apparent he was more of a figurehead and unlikely to be given a real opportunity to command the column.

The first action for No 3 Column after crossing the Buffalo River on 11 January took place the following day. This was an attack on Chief Sihayo's stronghold in the Batshe Valley. Glyn was nominally in command of A, C, E and H companies of the 2/24th Regiment, 1st Battalion, 3rd Natal Native Contingent and a detachment of Imperial and Colonial mounted troops. Chelmsford was in attendance and issued orders for how the attack should proceed so, in effect, Glyn was playing a supporting command role. However, Chelmsford and his staff watched the operation from the opposite side of the valley to where the attack took place giving Glyn some leeway. What his thoughts were of this 'audience' are open to conjecture. Glyn became well involved in the action having a narrow escape when a Zulu warrior took deliberate aim at him. A shouted warning from Lieutenant Charlie Harford, a NNC officer, almost certainly saved his life. There were two reasons behind the attack. The first was a sound military one in that Chelmsford did not want a strong Zulu force in his rear when he advanced on Ulundi. The second was punitive as Chelmsford wished to punish Sihayo's sons for their part in the murder of two of their father's wives. This event formed part of the ultimatum imposed on King Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 and one of the pretexts for the

invasion. The attack was a success mainly because Sihayo and most of his warriors had already left to join the Zulu army assembling at Ulundi.

Chelmsford undermined Glyn's authority following arrival of the column at Isandlwana campsite on 20 January. Glyn instructed how the campsite should be laid out and indicated his desire to prepare the ground for possible defensive purposes including laagering wagons and digging entrenchments. Chelmsford demurred and rejected Glyn's suggestion on the grounds that most wagons would be returning to Rorke's Drift for supplies. Chelmsford also indicated it was totally impractical to try and laager wagons because of the inordinate amount of time and effort involved in carrying out this manoeuvre. In all fairness, albeit Chelmsford was going against his own instructions, it is difficult to disagree with this logic. Likewise entrenching was a practical problem as ground at this location is extremely hard and rocky making it difficult to dig more than a few inches although it would not have prevented the erection of defensive walls from the many rocks littering the immediate area. Interestingly the subject of laagering and entrenchment would feature in a note submitted by Major Clery to a subsequent Court of Enquiry around the time criticism was being levelled at Glyn over defence of the campsite. Once Chelmsford made his points about defence Glyn seemed to accept them without protest. This ran true to form as both Sir Bartle Frere and General Cunynghame previously praised Glyn for being reliable and willing to follow orders in this way. Glyn later admitted responsibility for the campsite when he recorded:

'As regards outposts and ordinary precautions for the safety of the camp, I consider for all these arrangements I was wholly responsible'. Knowing Chelmsford had to consider the movements of all the invasion columns, Glyn admitted to being 'very diffident in volunteering an opinion adverse to a movement' he considered hazardous and did not feel inclined to speak out if his 'judgement dissented from a movement the general had ordered'. (6)

There was no properly structured intelligence department available at this time, but had there been, it may have resulted in Glyn providing a more positive contribution and robust challenge to areas of defence. As it was a number of officers were unhappy with defensive arrangements including Major Dunbar, Lieutenant Melvill and Commandant Hamilton-Browne of the 3rd NNC. Hamilton-Browne later stated Glyn looked depressed and shook his head in disbelief when he saw how Chelmsford's staff had allowed the camp to become overextended. On 21 January, Glyn received reports of Zulus gathering in the hills north-east of Isandlwana camp and suggested sending patrols to reconnoitre. Chelmsford considered it unnecessary, and without reference to Glyn, sent Major Dartnell south-east to reconnoitre the Mangeni Gorge near Isipezi. This side-lining, and obvious snub, was outlined in a cutting way by Major Clery in a note written to Colonel Harman on 17 February stating:

'He (Chelmsford) gave orders to their commandant of the natives....' 'and he also gave orders to the commandant of the volunteers'. Clery continued, 'The orders to both these commandants were given personally by the general himself, and this was absolutely necessary in this case as neither Colonel Glyn or myself knew in the least where they were being sent to, or what they were being sent for.' (7)

This was unforgivable and very unprofessional on Chelmsford's part bearing in mind Glyn had been appointed commander of the column and should have been consulted. Details of Clery's note were in a narrative compiled by Captain W. Penn-Symons 2/24th and he was later requested by Queen Victoria not to publish this scathing criticism of Chelmsford during his lifetime. This was because the Queen was a firm supporter of Chelmsford.

Major Dartnell reported back detailing his belief he had found the Zulu army and Chelmsford put Glyn in command of almost one half of No 3 Column with instructions to

leave camp in the early hours of 22 January to join Dartnell. The force detailed was six companies of 2/24th, four Royal Artillery guns and Natal Native Pioneers. Yet again Glyn would be a figurehead because Chelmsford joined the force resulting in messages and instructions flowing through, and by, him. Before leaving, Glyn instructed Clery to advise Colonel Pulleine of details from Glyn's own orders as Pulleine was to take command of the camp. There is no indication Colonel Durnford, commander of No 2 Column, would be instructed to take command on his eventual arrival. Glyn's original orders were in fact recovered from the battlefield as a souvenir and kept in private ownership until surfacing in 2001. Accepting things could have been done better; the papers showed Pulleine had complied with Chelmsford's orders for defensive measures.

The main role given to Glyn on the morning of 22 January was to establish a new camp near Mangeni. Having bivouacked there overnight, Chelmsford considered it an ideal location and instructed Glyn to set in motion arrangements to bring on the rest of the column from Isandlwana. Hamilton-Browne spoke to Glyn at Mangeni and was clearly surprised to see so many of No 3 Column away from the camp. He later recorded in his book *A Lost Legionary in South Africa*:

'Colonel Glyn rode over to me and drawing me aside said, "In God's name Maorie, what are you doing here?" I answered him with a question, "In God's name Sir what are you doing here?" He shook his head and replied, "I am not in command." And fine old soldier as he was, I could see he was much disturbed.' (8)

If Hamilton-Browne's account is correct, much of the foregoing detail demonstrates the dismissive attitude shown towards Glyn from just before the invasion started and before his regiment was annihilated during the attack on the camp. This clearly had an adverse effect on his morale and feelings of self-worth which were noted, and commented on, by supporters and detractors alike. His condition would obviously worsen following the slaughter of his regiment but early signs of despondency were already evident.

Following return to Isandlwana late in the day on 22 January after receiving messages it had been attacked; one cannot even begin to imagine the effect the devastating scene had on Glyn. Five companies of the 1/24th and one of the 2/24th lay slaughtered, along with their officers, many of whom Glyn had known and served with for a long period of time. The regiment was his life and this must have been a shattering experience. Glyn and some of his officers searched for comrades and in the dark he believed he could recognise Colonel Pulleine and Lieutenant Hodson. Of the 24th Regiment personnel at Isandlwana only two bandsmen, Glyn's groom, three men serving with the rocket battery and four mounted infantry escaped.

After spending a very disturbed night at the site the remainder of No 3 Column marched to Rorke's Drift early on the morning of 23 January. Having established what had occurred during the late afternoon and overnight battle at the post, Chelmsford soon left for Helpmekaar and then on to Pietermaritzburg. This so he could report on the disaster at Isandlwana and the heroic defence of Rorke's Drift to his political master, Sir Bartle Frere. Before leaving he instructed Glyn to remain behind and take command at Rorke's Drift to fortify the post with forces at his disposal. These included the original defenders of the post, and other companies of the 2/24th, in all totalling around 1,000 demoralised men. By doing this Chelmsford was, in effect, relieving Glyn of his column duties. That aside, due to his trauma Glyn was hardly in a fit state to command as he was in total shock trying to come to terms with the loss of his regiment. Accepting the whole force was traumatised to one degree or another, a good and caring commander would have relieved Glyn of the responsibility of

leadership. It was clear to see he was not in the frame of mind to carry out his duties in an effective manner.

Glyn believed the Zulu army could again attack the post at any time so set about having it fortified as strongly as possible. Men could move about outside during the day but Glyn insisted they came into the perimeter at night. The troops had no tents and little cover of any kind with a complete lack of waterproofs, blankets and spare clothing. There was constant rain and the post soon became unsanitary with the inevitable outbreak of illnesses. Glyn became withdrawn and listless displaying no real sense of purpose and not noticing or appreciating problems going on around him. Glyn was probably suffering from guilt syndrome often experienced by those who have survived, or not been directly involved in, a military action resulting in deaths of comrades. He believed he should have been with his men when they were slaughtered at Isandlwana. Glyn showed classic signs of what in more recent times has been classified as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and without doubt there was potential for a mental breakdown although suicidal tendencies were not apparent.

On 24 January Glyn permitted the by now disbanded NNC to depart from Rorke's Drift, and indicative of his state of mind, he sent an indecisive weakly worded note to Chelmsford:

'My Dear General,

The whole of the native contingent walked off this morning. Their rifles were taken from them; all the hospital bearers then went, and now the native pioneers are going. I am now left without any natives. What is to be done with Lonsdale and his Europeans? I shall, of course, keep them until I hear from you.' (9)

This hardly displayed firm, positive leadership required during this difficult time and went some way to reinforce the non-sympathetic poor opinion Chelmsford had formed of Glyn. This would colour his pronouncements on the Colonel in the months to come, especially in the letters sent to his friend and confidante, Evelyn Wood. Among others having little sympathy with the plight of Glyn was Captain Walter Jones, Royal Engineers, who wrote from Helpmekaar on 25 February 1879:

'.... This is decidedly the wrong column to be with now. Col. Glyn (our chief) does nothing and is effete....' (10)

Jones felt his commander had done little to ease suffering of sick and wounded men at Helpmekaar. This does, to an independent observer, seem a trifle unfair as Glyn had been left somewhat isolated at Rorke's Drift and his continuing trauma would not have helped. Misgivings at Rorke's Drift, which Glyn and his officers did little to dispel, included a perception the force had been left without any firm commitment of support. There was a feeling of isolation bordering on abandonment although this may perhaps be putting things a little too strongly. Another factor affecting morale, and acting as a constant reminder of men still laying unburied at Isandlwana, was the sight of vultures hovering over the battlefield for many weeks and descending to no doubt pick over the carcasses of fallen comrades.

On 27 January, Chelmsford set up a Court of Enquiry with the most restrictive brief to look into the reasons for loss of the camp at Isandlwana. The President was Colonel Hassard assisted by Colonels Raw and Harness. Although its stated aim was to look into the loss of the camp, clearly its main purpose was to protect Chelmsford's reputation and attempt to apportion blame on others. Durnford was top of the list closely followed by Pulleine for their alleged actions, or inactions, on the day. After them attention turned to Glyn with Chelmsford commenting on the defence of Isandlwana camp:

'Colonel Glyn was solely responsible' and 'that Colonel Glyn fully and explicitly accepted this responsibility cannot, however, affect the ultimate responsibility of the General-in-Command.' (11)

This was a shrewd move on Chelmsford's part. A show of magnanimity whilst at the same time blaming Glyn as being at least partly responsible for loss of the camp. One allegation suggested it was Glyn's fault the camp had been overrun because he had not ordered it to be entrenched. This was spectacularly rubbished when Major Clery produced a note to the Court of Enquiry written by Chelmsford. He had stated the ground at Isandlwana was too rocky to dig trenches and as the camp was soon to be moved, it was hardly worth fortifying. Clery did not mind whose toes he trod on, the more senior the better it seemed, and this note showed Chelmsford in a bad light. Glyn was not called to give evidence in person to the Court of Enquiry despite attending a mess meeting at Helpmekaar on 27 January, the day the enquiry was set up, and staying overnight. He could easily have been called and this omission speaks volumes.

Glyn provided evidence in a written report but not being called should at the very least have been subsequently queried by the military authorities and political establishment back in Britain. This was highly irregular because Glyn was a vital witness and again, the reasons for this omission are obvious. Chelmsford was anxious to receive a report of the action at Rorke's Drift as he knew the heroic defence would deflect some obvious negative comments that were almost certain to come his way following the losses at Isandlwana. He wanted good news for those back home and wrote to Glyn on 28 January requesting a report on the defence of Rorke's Drift along with names of those killed. Another request from Chelmsford's staff officer followed on 31 January querying why 'reports' had not been forwarded and one assumes this meant at least two almost certainly about Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. Glyn was basically admonished for not providing details of his column's entrenchment – presumably relating to the defence of Isandlwana camp – and the events of the 22 January. This was probably the last type of communication Glyn, in his delicate mental state, wished to receive but pressure was kept up when he received another note from Chelmsford on 3 February marked 'Private' with the following reminder:

'... Hope you have sent off Lt. Chard's report of the defence of Rorke's Drift post
– I am anxious to send off that little gleam of sunshine home as soon as possible.'
(12)

Although suffering from depression, Glyn was well aware attempts were being made to blame him for the disaster at Isandlwana and this view, unsurprisingly, was supported by Clery. As a result Glyn simply ignored this latest communication and he was aware Chard's report about events at Rorke's Drift had already been forwarded to Chelmsford. The only comment Glyn appended to the unanswered memorandum was:

'Odd the general asking me to tell him what he knows more than I do.' (13)

A few simple words perhaps but a veiled rebuttal of the obvious allegations being aimed in his direction.

On 15 February, a report about the bravery of men at Rorke's Drift, subsequently called the Bromhead Report, (although signed by Bromhead it is not known who actually wrote it) was submitted to Glyn. He simply forwarded it to Chelmsford without comment and the latter added Bromhead and Chard's names to the report for recognition of their actions. This was done without even bothering to discuss the matter with Glyn. One could be justified in feeling puzzled as to why Glyn did not make recommendations of awards to these two lieutenants especially, being the officer in command, it was his prerogative. Perhaps Chelmsford for his part was simply continuing with his efforts to side-line Glyn but equally the omission on Glyn's part could have been due to his troubled mind. (Copy of Bromhead Report attached as Appendix 'A').

It was not until 21 February that Glyn wrote his official report in his own hand and this still did not make a concrete recommendation for awards. It was all about Melvill and Coghill and recovery of the Colour with no mention of the defence of Rorke's Drift and parts played by Chard and Bromhead. Glyn's report cannot be regarded as accurate or conclusive being mainly based on hearsay and speculation. This all no doubt borne of a desire to show support of his men especially the actions of Melvill and Coghill in the attempt to save the Regiment's Queen's Colour. (Copy of Glyn's report attached as Appendix 'B').

A letter dated 23 February sent from Pietermaritzburg by Chelmsford to Wood reinforces his true thoughts about Glyn:

'I am afraid Russell will take a long time getting over to your side – No 3 column does, as you say, require working up, but how to do it is beyond my comprehension – Nothing but an entire change could produce such a result'. (14)

One must conclude Chelmsford considered Glyn's role from the time he arrived at Rorke's Drift to have been less than enterprising, and uninspiring, as he continued to remain on the defensive. Sadly no one seemed to recognise it was due to Glyn's fragile state of mind.

Apart from the most ardent of Chelmsford's supporters, the on-going pressure on Glyn fooled no one and many considered Chelmsford being the overall commander was at least partly, if not fully, to blame. Glyn indicated he was prepared to accept responsibility for details of the establishment of the camp but would not admit responsibility for movement of any portion of troops in and out of the camp. By accepting partial responsibility, Glyn 'took the wind out of the sails' of the Chelmsford camp. This was a sound response but not to Chelmsford's liking who suggested if Glyn disapproved of decisions taken about the camp, he should have protested and made these views known. Glyn was not prepared to succumb to this less than subtle pressure and pointed out it was his duty to obey his commander's orders and not dispute them. Chelmsford could see this approach was making no headway as Glyn was not prepared to 'cave in' on this issue. For the time being Chelmsford and his clique left things in abeyance but this was not the end of the matter.

Glyn could have capitalised on the differences of opinion by using whatever means were available to him including the 'stony ground' note. Acting as a gentleman, and to his credit, he did not do so. He was displaying loyalty to the military establishment and, indirectly, to his commanding officer. Perhaps this was misplaced loyalty but he continued to maintain silence about those seeking to discredit him. His wife Anne, described as a domineering woman with a cantankerous nature, was not bound by the same loyalties and robustly defended her husband's reputation and honour in the months ahead. Anne had no hesitation in criticising Chelmsford and his supporters and no one in Pietermaritzburg was under any illusion as to what she thought of Chelmsford and the shabby way her husband had been treated.

A damning report was eventually written for the Commander-in Chief of the Army, the Duke of Cambridge, by his Adjutant General Sir Charles Ellice. His observations on the disaster at Isandlwana were mostly aimed in a critical way as to how Chelmsford handled matters, especially in relation to defence of the camp and issues surrounding it. Attempts, at times crude in their execution, to tarnish Glyn's name were therefore not successful.

Whilst all the manoeuvring, political infighting and efforts to find scapegoats was going on, the miserable existence of life at Rorke's Drift continued as before. There were no Zulus within many miles of the post but due to Glyn's paranoia it would be almost two weeks after arriving before patrols were deployed. Even then it was not initially under his direction but organised by Major Black using volunteer officers and NCO's of the disbanded NNC although in due course Glyn did order regular mounted patrols into the surrounding countryside. The first patrols only ventured fleetingly into Zululand or checked the Buffalo

River downstream searching for bodies of men killed or drowned in the river near Fugitives' (Sothondose's) Drift. Glyn was anxious to discover the fate of Melvill and Coghill and although hesitating to order a search, being concerned it might result in confirmation the Regiment's Queen's Colour had been lost for ever, Glyn did eventually relent. A patrol led by Black on 4 February found the bodies of both men on the Natal bank overlooking Fugitives' Drift and hastily buried them. (The bodies were properly interred on 14 April and Glyn attended this moving ceremony).

A comprehensive search had resulted in the Colour case being found mixed up with other debris on the river bank and the pole found in the river nearby. Part of the silk flag was still attached although some came away when it was extracted from the river. Needless to say, recovery of the Colour was a great boost to morale and the honour of carrying it back to Rorke's Drift was given to Lieutenant Harford. He presented it to a very emotional Colonel Glyn and this moment was particularly poignant as he had personally been presented with the Colour by the Countess of Kimberley at The Curragh, Northern Ireland in June 1866. Glyn instructed the Colour to be taken to Helpmekaar the next day.

Existing communication systems meant it took several weeks for dispatches sent from South Africa to arrive in the United Kingdom. They were outlined in a number of newspapers one being *The Illustrated London News* which published details of the war every Saturday. The issue of 29 March 1879 carried a vivid description of receipt of the Colour at Rorke's Drift:

'.... These colours were borne back at the head of the little cavalcade in triumph, and when Rorke's Drift was reached the soldiers left their dinners or whatever occupation they were engaged upon, overjoyed at the sight of their lost colours regained, and gave their heartiest cheers for the old flag and for Major Black and the volunteers who had recovered them. The major, in a few well-chosen words, then handed the colours to Colonel Glyn amidst loud huzzahs, and the colonel with heartfelt emotion, on behalf of himself and his regiment, thanked the little band for the noble work they had undertaken and successfully performed.' (15)

The day after the Colour was recovered Glyn rode ahead of the escort to Helpmekaar to receive it. Upon receipt he handed the Colour to Lieutenant Heaton for safe custody and Heaton duly presented it to Major Upcher commanding the two surviving 1/24th companies. This very traumatic and emotional moment for Colonel Glyn was recorded by Colonel Arthur Harness:

'Poor Glyn, in speaking to the two companies under Major Upcher fairly broke down. He said that fourteen years before, he and Upcher were the officers to receive that Colour, and they were again receiving it being almost the only officers left with the regiment'. (16)

The poor weather did not improve and due to insanitary conditions at Rorke's Drift a decision was taken in early March to build a new, larger fort overlooking the Buffalo River named Fort Melvill. However, Glyn still fearing Zulu attacks kept the men confined within the fort facilitating spread of sickness and disease. It was described as damp and unsuitable so not a great improvement on Rorke's Drift. Meanwhile, Chelmsford continued with negative sentiments about Glyn in a communication to Wood on 15 April 1879. He was looking to provide a replacement for Captain Ronald Campbell, killed at Hlobane on 28 March when he wrote:

'I condole with you in your loss of Ronald Campbell – I do not see how I can move Clery from Glyn until I finally dispose of the latter. You shall have him however as a staff officer if I can possibly arrange it.' (17)

Within a short period of time after the Isandlwana setback, reinforcements began to arrive in South Africa in preparation for the second invasion of Zululand and the British led force was now named the South African Field Force. Glyn was appointed to command the First Infantry Brigade of the Second Division under General Newdigate. Yet again this was almost a nominal role for Newdigate as Chelmsford would accompany this spearhead division. Clearly appointing Glyn to a position of command did not sit easily with Chelmsford as evidenced in a letter he wrote to Wood from Dundee on 1 May:

‘I am forced to make Glyn Brigadier with Newdigate, as there is absolutely no one who is better! The camp here (Dundee) shows that neither he nor Clery have learnt anything from Isandlwana! - The latter is I fear an impostor in the Field – His place is that of Professor at a military school.’ (18)

Chelmsford made these comments due to being unhappy about the lack of defensive arrangements at Dundee and one wonders if he was still rankled by the ‘stony ground’ note presented by Clery to the Court of Enquiry.

Before the second invasion could take place it was imperative to recover serviceable wagons from Isandlwana along with an initial attempt at hurried burials. Glyn instructed no burials of 24th Regiment personnel should be undertaken as this would be done in due course by their comrades. This was not universally popular because it was felt out of respect remains should be buried as soon as possible but General Newdigate agreed to the request. A force of 2,490 under the command of General Marshall was detailed for the wagon recovery on 21 May and the stay on the field was to be as brief as possible. Colonel Glyn’s wishes, possibly made as a means of dealing with his on-going grief, were honoured by General Marshall who left untouched any bodies identified as members of the 24th Regiment.

Archibald Forbes, *The Daily News* reporter, was present on the 21st and his report included the fact Glyn, who had accompanied the force, found a letter written by himself addressed to Melville and dated 21 January. Forbes disagreed with Glyn’s sentiments that only members of the 24th be allowed to bury large numbers of their own dead spread around the battlefield. Like others, he thought there was still a faint chance of identifying individuals by personal artefacts and remnants of uniforms. He also considered it inappropriate to leave the burials until only a few bones could be recovered from the battlefield. It is difficult not to agree with the view expressed by Forbes but equally it is understandable why the 24th wished to deal with the internment of their comrades in a way which might give them a small measure of closure. After the force left the battlefield Marshall’s report back to Newdigate included:

‘... Protected by vedettes I buried all bodies near the battlefield of Isandula which could be recognised as other than those of the 24th Regiment. The latter, in accordance with your instructions were left untouched....’ (19)

Glyn’s First Brigade crossed the Ncome (Blood) River on 31 May and the Second Division was reorganised in middle June preparatory to the attack on Ulundi. The 1/24th, 58th and 94th Regiments formed a single brigade under Glyn but he was angered to learn the 24th were not to play a significant part in the final battle of the Zulu War at Ulundi on 4 July. Glyn and his men wanted the opportunity to avenge regimental losses at Isandlwana but it was not to be. Chelmsford indicated the five companies of the 1/24th were made up of many newly appointed officers and men considered too inexperienced to be part of the final battle but this was not entirely correct. There were certainly a number of inexperienced recruits but also a good number of experienced troops who had transferred from other line regiments to the 1/24th after hearing of the Isandlwana disaster. Along with a company of Royal Engineers they were left near the White Mfolozi River to guard two laagers and a stone redoubt called Fort Nolela, the advanced and final supply base. Glyn and eight officers from the ‘old’ 1/24th

were inside the British square for the decisive battle and the only other representatives of the regiment at this final confrontation were twenty members of the 1/24th forming part of 1st Squadron, Imperial Mounted Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Edward Browne. One can only wonder at what passed through Glyn's mind as the British secured victory over those who had slaughtered his regiment at Isandlwana.

Following the battle of Ulundi, Glyn travelled to Pinetown having been nominated to present the Victoria Cross to Surgeon Major James Reynolds for his part in the defence of Rorke's Drift and Lieutenant Browne, 1/24th Regiment, for his actions during the Zulu attack at Khambula on 29 March. On 14 August Glyn handed over his Brigade responsibilities and once again took command of the 1/24th just prior to their return to Britain. On 2 September Glyn and his family sailed on *SS Egypt* arriving at Portsmouth on 2 October. The Duke of Cambridge came on board to inspect the Battalion and see the Colour recovered from the river at Fugitives' Drift painstakingly repaired by Mrs Glyn on the journey home.

Despite the war being over, Chelmsford was still attempting to blame others, including Glyn, for loss of the camp at Isandlwana. In February 1880 Chelmsford prepared a long memo in response to criticism of the Zulu War campaign by the reporter, Forbes, which included positioning of the camp. Part of that response included:

'The camp was laid out by Major Clery acting under Colonel Glyn's orders and no remonstrance was made either by the last-named officer or by Major Dartnell -'
(20)

Chelmsford was still determined to deflect criticism from himself. In other words 'lay the blame at the feet of Glyn and not me'. It must be remembered however, that Forbes had 'an axe to grind' as Chelmsford had refused his request to be awarded the South Africa Zulu War medal.

To conclude, during the Anglo Zulu War Glyn was a man subjected to a great deal of stress brought on by a whole range of factors many outside of his personal control. Firstly, having his command of No 3 (Centre) Column negated to a degree due to the presence of Chelmsford and his staff. This was followed by the ignoring of his suggestions to fortify and entrench supply depots at Helpmekaar and Rorke's Drift. Likewise with the columns campsite on the Zulu side of the Buffalo River and, most importantly of all, the campsite at Isandlwana. A recommendation for a directed mounted patrol was also ignored. These examples clearly had an immense impact on Glyn's morale and self-esteem.

None of the above however, could have compared to seeing his slain and mutilated regiment on the Isandlwana battlefield. Following this, Chelmsford compounded the stress and anxiety by leaving Glyn in command at Rorke's Drift along with the continual pressure of demands for reports concerning the actions of 22nd/23rd January. It is hard to appreciate how difficult it must have been for Glyn to try and remain calm and focused whilst doing his best, albeit displaying signs of paranoia, to maintain the welfare of men remaining to garrison Rorke's Drift. Sadly the paranoia to try and ensure disaster did not overwhelm the garrison, as had happened at Isandlwana, led to a degree of inertia and brought him very close to a breakdown. Not being called to give evidence in person at the subsequent Court of Enquiry was another example of side-lining Glyn although the motives may have had a darker side. Personal attendance may not have been to Chelmsford's liking although there is no evidence to suggest Glyn was likely to discredit his superior despite his depressive state.

In Victorian times the symptoms of battle-theatre stress and anxiety were not openly recognised in the military forces, especially if suffered by senior officers, as they were expected to 'keep a stiff upper lip' no matter the circumstances. Failure to do so could easily result in an individual being labelled a coward and it is likely this weighed heavily on Glyn's mind although this is purely supposition. In the face of many pressures Glyn maintained

dignity and composure at a time of enormous stress, the implications of which would be present even when the war was over, and he continued to fulfil his command responsibilities until the conclusion of the battle of Ulundi. This, despite the fact that Chelmsford admitted to confidantes, that he only kept Glyn as there were none better who were available to him. Chelmsford dealt a final blow to Glyn's pride when he did not involve the 1/24th within the square at Ulundi for the final battle.

One is left with the impression that Glyn did all he could to undertake his responsibilities to the best of his ability and with hindsight it is difficult to appreciate how he was able to avoid a complete breakdown. He appears to have had amazing resilience and was able to dig deep to hold everything together. Throughout Glyn maintained loyalty and support to the Army, his regiment, colleagues and senior officers. He may not have been the ablest of commanders but it is suggested, despite any shortcomings, Glyn was a man to be admired and not vilified.

Glyn gave up command of the 1/24th in May 1880 to take responsibility for the Brigade Depot at Brecon and in 1881 the regiment was renamed 'The South Wales Borderers'. Glyn was promoted major general in 1882 and honoured with a KCB. He retired as a lieutenant general and in 1898 given the title Colonel of The South Wales Borderers thus proving his career was not inhibited by the events at Isandlwana. However, it probably brought him little solace. Glyn never fully recovered from the shock of losing so many of his beloved regiment at the scene of carnage on the Isandlwana battlefield and it was constantly on his mind for the remainder of his life. When he saw his regiment off once more to fight a war in far-off South Africa, the Boer War 1899-1902, he must despite his pride have been filled with misgivings and concern for their welfare. He would not live to learn of the regiment's involvement in that war as he died on 21 November 1900 hopefully to meet up again, in another place, with those loved and lost comrades from Isandlwana.