

THE IMPACT OF WHITE EXPANSIONISM ON THE ZULU NATION

A comparison of Professor Coupland's seminal thesis (1930) with views of current historians and writers, supported by personal visits to Zululand's battlefields.

Andrew Elliot-Smith

(Andrew is eighteen years old and the great-grandson of Sir Grafton Elliot-Smith, physician and Egyptologist. This article formed part of Andrew's 'A' Level history project for the recent 1999 examinations – for which he received an A Grade, and went on to study archaeology at Oxford University).

Since the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, the majority of historians have followed the theory of the eminent 1930's historian, Sir Reginald Coupland (Oxon.) whose treatise *Zulu Battle Piece – Isandhlwana* (sic) accounted for the downfall of the Zulu Nation following their defeat at Ulundi by the British in 1879.

The modern Zulu War historian, Ian Knight, wrote that Sir Reginald Coupland was the foremost living authority in the 1930's on the history of the British Empire. Coupland's book describes "the situation between whites and blacks, the great military qualities and terrifying military tactics of the Zulu warriors". He considered the role of the soldiers and politicians involved with the war, culminating in the aftermath that "averted irretrievable disaster". This authoritative book was written following a single visit to the battlefields in 1930 and, due to his reputation, has formed the cornerstone for the numerous investigations into this campaign - until 1995 when his theories began to be challenged by historians using new and original sources.

In this essay, I propose to analyse Coupland's salient points (both military and social) to establish or challenge the reliability of his work, which have been included in bold Italic throughout. Because this essay's scope is quite enormous, I decided that it was necessary to approach it by a process of elimination. I intend to examine a series of questions based on Coupland's statements, with the aim of reaching a conclusion, and within this, look at what I feel are the most significant effects of white intervention upon the Zulu Nation.

I have used material from a wide range of primary and secondary sources as well as information gained from four personal visits to Zululand; these enabled me to experience the feel of Africa, and gain a greater knowledge and understanding of perhaps the most misunderstood, controversial and politically desperate situation to face a once great Nation - Zululand. I have conducted several interviews with noted Zulu historians, all experts in this field.

THE ORIGINS OF THE ZULU NATION TO 1835 – AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL REVIEW WITH REFERENCE TO THE BANTU AND ZULU DEVELOPMENT AND AN ASSESSMENT OF COUPLAND'S VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT.

Coupland's quotations are in Italic bold throughout.

The Bantu were one clan of many, drifting south-eastwards from the tropical heart of Africa.

This statement is essentially true, although the absolute anthropological origins of the Bantu are unknown. The term 'Bantu' is the European adoption of the ancient black native *abaNtu*, which means 'people'. However, research suggests that in approximately 8000BC they entered Africa from the Middle East. As their lives were exclusively centred on cattle, they were adept at nomadic life and gradually spread south and laterally across central Africa until eventually reaching the West Coast.

This hypothesis is supported by Prof. Stringer's recently published 'African Exodus' (1998) that the Bantu retraced their route and progressed south east until they reached the Kalahari desert after which one branch of the Bantu tribe, the Nguni, settled in the area known today as Natal during 1500-1700 AD. Meanwhile, the majority of the Bantu, who were to become the Xhosa tribe, steadily moved further south to within, unknowingly, 500 miles of the first European colony at the Cape. Coupland's statement is not sufficient to justify the origins of a nation that had such an influence on history.

The Zulu power was the creation of King Chaka (sic), a despot of unusual brutality.

According to the definitive *Washing of the Spears*, (Donald Morris 1970), which appears to be based on numerous primary sources, the origins of the Zulus can be traced to back to the end of the 17th century. The Nguni tribe amounted to no more than three thousand people under the leadership of their ageing chief, Jobe. Jobe had two sons, Godonwana and Utana, who were both eager to claim the throne for themselves. As a result of this, Jobe sent soldiers to kill both of his threatening sons. Godonwana was seriously injured but managed to escape to the Drakensberg Mountains, Utana died from a mysterious disease.

In an attempt to avoid detection by Jobe, Godonwana changed his name to Dingiswayo. On his father's death, Dingiswayo returned to the Nguni to find another brother, Mtetwa, on the throne. Whilst travelling to the Nguni, Dingiswayo encountered a white trader from whom he acquired a gun and a horse. When Mtetwa saw these strange objects he fled for his life; however Dingiswayo tracked him down and had him executed.

Dingiswayo, now with a modest share of influence, trained approximately 400 warriors and, following a policy of brutal subjugation, absorbed the surrounding tribes to enlarge his kingdom, replacing unwanted chiefs with his own trusted chiefs.

At that time, an 'insignificant' fringe group of about 200 people lived on the banks of the Mfolozi River under Chief Mandalela, who subsequently had a son named 'Zulu' who succeeded him. Under Zulu, the group thrived and when he died Senzangakoma succeeded him. The group had grown to about 1,000 and adopted the name "Zulu".

Senzangakoma had numerous wives, (as was the custom) nevertheless, he illicitly courted the daughter (Nandi) of a neighbouring eLangeni chief. Senzangakoma couldn't marry her because she was not a Zulu, even though she was pregnant with his child.

Nandi gave birth to a son, and was banished by the eLangeni, which forced Senzangakoma to adopt Nandi as his third unofficial wife. He refused to acknowledge the boy, which resulted in Nandi naming him 'iShaka', after a common intestinal beetle. When Shaka was in his teens, he had the misfortune of losing some goats belonging to Senzangakoma; Nandi and her family were forcibly evicted back to the eLangeni who deliberately persecuted them.

In 1802 there was widespread famine throughout Southern Africa forcing Nandi and her family into destitution. They gradually made their way to the Qwabe clan where Nandi had previously had another son called Geneyana. Under Geneyana's guidance, Shaka became a superb warrior and excelled in hunting and battle techniques. On hearing about Shaka's success, Senzangakoma invited Shaka back. (The motive for this 'invitation' is still unknown. It was most likely to murder him).

In order to protect Shaka, Nandi moved to another distant clan. Shaka's fearless reputation increased and at the age of 24, Shaka was called to the 'IziCwa amabutho' of King Dingiswayo where he rose through the regiments until he commanded the Iziqwa regiment and changed their traditional battle methods.


Thus it can be shown that Zulu power was well established before the advent of Shaka.

Intertribal warfare was not very destructive – defeated tribes lived to fight again.


My extensive reading suggests that the new battle tactics were far from, "not destructive". A good example to demonstrate this is as follows: Shaka mobilised his highly trained and efficient army against the neighbouring Butelezi tribe, both sides adopting the traditional abuse-hurling line up or 'guia'.

The whole 'battle' was generally bloodless being a shouting match at 25 yards.

TACTICS PRE SHAKA
Traditional 'guia' formation:



SHAKA'S BATTLE TACTICS



Shaka's half-brother, Bakaza, led the Butelezi tribe. Shaka led his men forward as the 'guia' commenced. Unconventionally, Shaka immediately killed Bakaza then led the *Iziqwa* into a charge against the disorganised Butelezi. Dingesweyo called a halt to the slaughter and offered Shaka the position of heir apparent, which he accepted. Dingesweyo called Sensangakoma to discuss the succession to Sensangakoma's throne; mysteriously he had already appointed another son, Sigugama.

Dingiswayo immediately sent Shaka with a large escort to challenge Sigugama. When he arrived at Sigugama's kraal he found him dead, killed by his own people due to their fear of Shaka.

The Xhosas, Pondos and other Kaffir tribes were pushed to the south, the Basutos into the mountains, the Mosilikatzi to the 'High Veldt - that was the limit of Chaka's triumphs.

In my opinion, this statement is unjust, based on my understanding of numerous relevant sources (see bibliography). Shaka reigned in a ruthless manner, perfecting his battle tactics (see above), and training his warriors (starting with no more than 300) to be optimally efficient. He also developed the new thrusting assegai, or 'ikwa'. During 1818, the Zulu sphere of influence was increasing while other distant Bantu tribes were in a fierce internecine struggle.

It was three Nguni chiefs who were the main perpetrators of this tribal warfare (known as the *mfecane* or 'crushing'). As a result, Dingesweyo accompanied his army in an attempt to restore peace; however he was captured and beheaded by Chief Zwide. Shaka was enraged by this action and therefore waged war on Zwide eventually destroying him and his whole army.

By 1882, Shaka's army had grown to over 20,000; its influence extended from the Indian Ocean to the Drakensberg Mountains, into the Kalahari Desert, north to Lake Malawi and south to the Northern Cape. There was only one detractor, Chief Mzilikazi who, rather than face Shaka, moved his intimidated tribe to the northern Transvaal where they lived peacefully until the arrival of the Boers in 1836.

In 1824, Shaka, aware of a handful of whites at Port Natal, invited them to visit him at KwaBulaweyo, (the place of he who kills), under the protection of an impressive escort.

A SOCIAL REVIEW OF THE PERIOD – ZULU CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POPULATIONS WITH RELEVANT COMPARISONS TO THE BRITISH INVASION FORCE, WITH AN ANALYSIS OF COUPLAND'S VIEW.

Coupland appears to have understood the relationship between the Zulu King and his army, as well as the social structure. His depth of knowledge was far more advanced than that of his predecessors although, following extensive research, I now believe he underestimated their situation.

The links between the Zulu people and the land upon which they depended for their livelihood were immediate. The Zulu's were fortunate, because their physical environment was particularly well suited to their needs as keepers of herds and tillers of the soil.

The Zulus are the most famous of the native peoples of South Africa and owe their fame to their military record.

Although this is partly true, I feel that it is a devastatingly inaccurate reflection of their lifestyle for the following reasons: The Zulus were essentially pastoralists, not warriors. The paramount importance of cattle in their lives was symbolised by the location of their cattle fold or *isibaya*, in the centre of every village, or *umuzi*, where all ceremonies and rituals were performed and many taboos were related to this area. The deep grain storage pits were also located here. A Zulu man was never happier than when contemplating his cattle and a large herd indicated immense wealth.

Marriage was only legalised, and then legitimised, with the transferral of cattle to the girl's father as compensation for the loss of her domestic capacity in his household, (known as the *ilobolo* system). Cattle were of basic material value, offering not only meat and milk but also hides for garments and shields. In fact, cattle were so important that in a military conflict, the victor would capture the loser's herd. Marriage and the establishment of a homestead were banned without the permission of the king, and permission was usually only granted when a warrior had vindicated himself in battle. Shaka effectively controlled both his economy and population expansion by banning marriage in drought years.

Zulus in the 1870s were not unnecessarily warlike and did not employ a standing army. By the time of the Anglo Zulu war, they had been at peace for 23 years. However, in times of tribal tension, it was possible to raise an effective army at short notice. My research into the structure of the Zulu Army is as follows, with appropriate references to the similarities in the British Army.

From a very young age, boys would learn to herd their goats; at the age of 18 they would be summoned from across the territories to form an *ibutho* or troop where they would be required to build their own quarters, and train in military tactics. In contrast, the British army was still regarded as the desperate man's escape and private soldiers were looked on as such. Even though the days of convicts being given the choice of 'prison or army' was over, the view predominated. Soldiers found that the army was even more restricting than their previous life and only a foreign posting broke the monotony of barrack life.

According to David Rattray (personal interview) there were approximately 75,000 to 96,000 Zulus during Shaka's reign, which grew to 300,000 under the influence of the Zulu king by 1879. However, due to a state of constant readiness spanning these eras, only those fit to move and reproduce would survive. Any misdemeanour was punishable with death; methods included (a) impaling (b) a downward stab from the armpit into the heart with an assegai or (c) having one's neck broken. The British were also severe disciplinarians with flogging commonplace. During the six-month Zulu war, 545 soldiers were flogged, with a typical sentence for drunkenness being 25 lashes.

Official records of the Intelligence Branch of the War Office (Quartermaster – Generals Dept. records – War Office - 1879) state that the physical requirements of the Zulu army were particularly stringent, with new recruits having to be able to run 50 miles per day – those who couldn't were sometimes executed. By comparison, the physical standard of the average British recruit actually fell. In 1870 the average height for

a soldier was 5'8" but by the start of the Zulu War it had dropped to 5'4". However, as with Zulu chiefs, the emphasis for the British officer was placed on fitness, loyalty, team spirit and physical bravery.

With regard to Zulu women, they were expected to work hard in the *umuzi* (kraal) and the field, and simply have children. Women were also subject to execution if they did not conform to Zulu custom, especially with regard to infidelity.

Zulu health matters were referred to a *sangoma* (a 'doctor' but not a *witch* doctor), who was so respected that patients usually recovered after being prescribed a lotion or potion – if they didn't recover, they were simply killed. Witch doctors were the king's 'intelligence officers' who looked out for spies, malcontents and those considered lazy. With regard to the health of the British Army, soldiers lived under the less than weatherproof canvas of the large Army bell tent, which held fifteen men arranged around the centre pole. There were no groundsheets issued and the men had only a blanket or greatcoat to cover themselves. Often, on the march or after the disaster at Isandlwana, there were no tents so the men slept in the open in all weathers, (similar to Zulus on a march). Many British soldiers became victims of chronic rheumatism. The officers, on the other hand, carried enough equipment to make campaign life quite pleasant. They shared tents with no more than two officers, slept on camp beds and relaxed in folding chairs.

Water was carried by individual British soldiers in unsanitary wooden water bottles known as the "Oliver". The medical profession was only just beginning to discover water-borne diseases so there was little restriction on where drinking water was obtained. As a consequence, the incidence of dysentery and typhoid was high – unlike the Zulu warriors who were accustomed to the water of the Veld.

Campaign life brought the British troops closer to their officers. The men developed a knack of contrasting a caring officer with one who showed remoteness and indifference. Colonel Redvers Buller VC was an example of an officer who was popular and respected in that he shared all conditions with his men. Trooper George Mossop recalled that; “

If we were lying in the rain, so was Buller. If we were hungry, so was he. All of the hardships he shared equally with his men.

This was similar to the case of officers in the Zulu army who generally maintained good relations with their warriors, although all were subject to the mercy of their superiors. It is also important to mention that the Zulu warriors followed orders as blindly as the British troops; neither side's soldiers had an overall concept of what they were campaigning for.

Coupland's book does effectively describe the Zulu Army, although in my opinion, exaggerating the 'bloodthirsty' and 'savage' image so as to support his argument.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZULU NATION 1836 - 1879: THE ZULU NATION UNDER PRESSURE FROM WHITE EXPANSIONISM WITH AN ANALYSIS OF COUPLAND'S THEORIES.

In the early 1870's the instability of the existing equipoise of white and black began to manifest itself beneath the peaceful surface... – one reason for this was the acquisition of firearms by the natives.

Coupland's view suggests that the Zulus were belligerent, and sought military confrontation with the British. However, my research indicates the reality was somewhat different.

King Dingane withdrew his army following the 1838 defeat of the Zulus at Blood River. Although defeated in battle, Dingane possessed large numbers of Boer guns, cattle and horses and he spent the following months consolidating his position. The Boers continued migrating across the Drakensberg Mountains and settled on the central plateau of Zululand.

The Boers realised the Zulus were in disarray and mounted a massive punitive expedition, which included Mpande's Zulus in support of the Boers, mainly to recapture their lost cattle and horses. During the protracted skirmishing which followed, the Boers recovered most of their cattle and Dingane was forced to flee across the northern Pongola River where he was murdered by his own people – eager, I suspect, for a return to peace.

The news of Dingane's death swept across Natal (various newspaper reports - Ladysmith Museum) and beyond to the many tribes who had been displaced by Shaka and Dingane. These commenced their own steady trek back to their homelands, only to discover that the Boers were already settling their lands. The Boer Volksraad (Council) decreed that these natives, now homeless, were to be rounded up and moved into a native homeland well away from the Boer sphere of influence.

In 1845, Britain seized the opportunity to annex the whole of Natal into the Cape Colony, including Boer held territory. During this European upheaval in Natal, the Zulus, under their new king Mpande, had withdrawn to the north side of the Buffalo and Tugela rivers. By now, the Zulus were under political and

territorial pressure from Europeans based at Portuguese controlled Delagoa Bay, by British dominated Natal and by Voortrekkers south of the Tugela and Mzinyathi rivers.

Zulu possession of antiquated firearms did not affect their battle tactics; they were probably no more than a status symbol.

The Zulu military system was in some sense a 'standing menace' to the peace of Natal.

British Parliamentary papers of 1879 reveal that King Cetshwayo had observed the underlying tension between the British in Natal and the Transvaal Boers and knew he was in a position of considerable strength. He totally controlled Zululand and in order to strengthen his grip further, he courted friendship with the British, whereupon Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs, appointed Cetshwayo heir apparent, in the name of Queen Victoria. Cetshwayo was aware that his future thereafter depended, to a degree, on British support.

When Mpande died in 1872 after thirty relatively peaceful years on the Zulu throne, Cetshwayo became king and immediately sought British confirmation of his position. Cetshwayo, perhaps the most intelligent of all the Zulu kings, now ruled a united nation, his army was at its strongest and the Zulus had a most powerful friend, Queen Victoria - and no apparent enemies.

Meanwhile, the British encouraged its High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, to pursue the policy of 'Confederation'. By combining all the territories in South Africa, Britain could control both resources and policy through a system of central and regional government. To this end, Shepstone annexed the Transvaal on the pretext of saving the Boers from their own bankrupt economy and to discourage the Zulus from raiding Boer farms in the disputed areas of Zululand.

The British knew full well that Zululand must be included in any policy of Confederation, principally because Zululand still possessed sufficient available land for settlement and an untapped labour source. There remained one problem; the Zulu's autocratic king and his potential army of forty thousand warriors who would never agree to an effective surrender and dissolution of Zululand merely to facilitate British economic development. Meanwhile, occasional Zulu incursions against isolated Boer farms and Bantu migrants illicitly settling in Zululand increased. These retaliatory raids encouraged European scaremongering, making war against the Zulus justifiable, though Cetshwayo remained unaware of this subversive undercurrent. For the Zulus, the writing was clearly on the wall.

Even when Britain threatened Cetshwayo with an impossible ultimatum, and massed her troops along the Zululand border, Cetshwayo still withheld the actual order for his army to attack. When Britain invaded Zululand, Cetshwayo gave his *indunas* (Chiefs) orders for a specific attack on Chelmsford's central column, hedged with two restrictions; they must not attack any fortified or static position and not threaten the British Natal border.

Britain invaded Zululand on the 11th January 1879. On the 17th January, the Zulu army began leaving their base on the Mahlabatini Plain to face the invaders and the trail they left in the grass was to remain visible for many months. Their destination was a gorge just three miles from an unknown rock outcrop, known locally as Isandlwana.

During 1877, Anthony Trollope travelled through southern Africa and parts of Zululand just as European hysteria was mounting; yet he viewed the Zulus as being perceptive and living in sympathy with their time and environment. He wrote,

I have no fears myself that Natal will be overrun by hostile Zulus; - but much fear that Zululand should be overrun by hostile Britons.

This considered statement, and the fact that Zululand had enjoyed 23 years of peaceful co-existence with Britain, hardly supports the notion of Coupland's '*standing menace*'.

ZULU RESISTANCE TO CONFEDERATION WITH REFERENCE TO COUPLAND'S VIEWS ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR.

As Ian Knight states in his introduction to the 1991 edition of Coupland's book,

Coupland realised that the war was a result of a forward policy adopted by the British representative of the Cape, Sir Bartle Frere, and not of any act by King Cetshwayo". He also mentions, "Coupland also recognised the ambivalent attitude of the Colonial Office in London, which realised that the Confederation scheme could lead to war with the Zulus.

Ian Knight again states,

despite the learned arguments which still rage about the causes of the war, few scholars can find fault with that judgement,

and, having read most accessible literature on the subject, I have come to the same conclusion.

By 1873 Cetshwayo was already a military leader of standing whose available army of some 40,000 warriors could be mobilised at very short notice. Zulu military culture, formulated by historical precedent, allowed for very few options in the event of an attack on Zululand. Any threat against families and cattle herds demanded an immediate military response, a factor that was played down or even ignored by the British High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, in the events leading up to the war.

Cetshwayo had no major differences with the British. He was quietly confident that Sir Bartle Frere would honour the territorial integrity of his kingdom, and that his military superiority was enough to deter any thought of military invasion. The Great Council of Zulu Chiefs was more militant in defence of their rights and was critical of the increasing levels of interference in Zulu affairs by the British administration.

The British Ultimatum:

In 1879, independent Zululand was bordered to the south by the British colony of Natal, where the Tugela and Buffalo rivers formed a natural boundary. To the north, the Pongola River separated Zululand from Swaziland and Portuguese East Africa. The western boundary was defined by the Drakensberg escarpment, against which lay the independent Boer Republic of Transvaal.

Army Commander Lord Chelmsford's Official Records (Army Records Society) record that Sir Bartle Frere served in the British colonial administration as the High Commissioner for South Africa from 1877 to 1880. Shortly after his arrival in the Cape Colony he was confronted by a complex political situation which hindered the orders given to him for the Confederation of South Africa.

These records show that in 1878 Sir Bartle Frere embarked on a programme of political harassment against Cetshwayo in order to bring the Zulu empire to an end as quickly as possible, and in doing so expand the British colonial influence north of the Tugela River. He did not have the sanction of the home government but was supported by Theophilus Shepstone, his Native Affairs Commissioner, in his plan. Cetshwayo was bewildered by this hostile turn of events and, before he was able to respond with dignity, he was confronted with an impossible ultimatum.

Cetshwayo was unable to comply with these demands which he regarded as an insult to both his sovereignty and the Zulu Nation. When no reply was received from Cetshwayo within the necessary 30 days, Sir Bartle Frere declared war on Zululand.

The British, expecting that Cetshwayo could and would not comply with the terms set out in the ultimatum, had massed troops and provisions along the southern border of Zululand. General Lord Chelmsford, the military commander of forces in South Africa, was ordered to invade Zululand, destroy the capital at Ulundi, and to capture Cetshwayo. On the 11th January 1879 the invasion began. The campaign lasted only six months during which the British suffered their worst military defeat (Isandlwana) but inflicted final defeat on the Zulus at Ulundi on the 4th July 1879.

HOW EFFECTIVELY DID THE ZULU NATION ADAPT TO THE CHALLENGE OF WHITE EXPANSIONISM?

On a very hot 1st September 1879, some two hundred senior Zulu dignitaries and chiefs were summoned to the British camp where Wolseley, would address them concerning the fate of the defeated Zulus through his interpreter John Shepstone. The gathered assembly was brusquely informed that their captured King Cetshwayo was being sent into exile and would never return to Zululand and that Zululand was to be divided into thirteen independent 'chiefdoms'.

Only four of these carefully selected chiefs were present at the meeting and they all signed an agreement. Amongst other stipulations, they were obligated to respect their new boundaries, to abolish the formal Zulu military system and not obstruct any of their people who might wish to work in neighbouring territories.

The Zulus were forbidden to import firearms or become involved in any form of trade that did not reach them through British controlled Natal or the Transvaal. Capital punishment without trial was forbidden; land could not be sold or purchased without British permission and they were to keep the peace and apply the law according to the 'ancient laws and customs' of their people, so long as these laws did not offend the sensitivities of the British administrator.

The inevitable result of Wolseley's settlement was a crippling and very destructive civil war by which the Zulu lost everything they had gained by their lengthy resistance to the invasion. It is generally accepted that the British invasion of Zululand severely disrupted the Zulus' economic structure and caused massive loss of life. Their military defeat also resulted in the total destruction of their political system.

The Zulus' attention was now diverted away from the political upheaval to the vital tasks of preventing starvation and re-planting for the coming season. A new Boundary Commission was given instructions to lay down, where possible, the borders of the chiefdoms following natural physical features.

Without exception, these new chiefs were men who had either fought for the British or had deserted Cetshwayo prior to his capture; however Mnyamana, Cetshwayo's chief councillor, was offered a territory but refused to accept it. Various interpretations were given for this; although a popular Zulu view is that it was out of loyalty to the exiled king. His own explanation to the Boundary Commission was that,

I honestly considered that I was going to be given a tract of country which, though amply large enough for my extensive following, yet...it did not include one-third of the land where my kraals were situated.

In my view it is probable that the 1879 settlement was deliberately designed to set Zulu against Zulu. When the Boundary Commissioners informed Wolseley that many of the appointed chiefs were unsuitable, he responded by omitting that portion of their report! And when some of the settlement's more severe problems came to light, Wolseley responded by stating that the fault lay, not in the settlement itself, but the Zulus' unwillingness to comply with its terms.

I believe Wolseley was fully aware that the settlement would create anomalies of this kind, and accordingly he instructed the Boundary Commission to inform the Zulus that, if they objected to the chief appointed over them, then they were free to move to another chief's territory. The Zulu people, however, were not unlike any other people; they were bonded to the districts where they had been born, which their ancestors had won by farming and force of arms.

One chief, Zibhebhu, had been appointed to his own area at Bangonomo in the north. This was curious because it had been Zibhebhu who, as commander of scouts, had kept British patrols away from the main army on the last stage of the march to Isandlwana and then played a prominent part in the battle. It was Zibhebhu who commanded the force which harassed British scouting and watering parties on their final approach to Ulundi, and, indeed, he had very nearly trapped Buller's mounted men in a skirmish the day before the battle of Isandlwana. In the aftermath of the British victory, Zibhebhu compounded his sins by offering sanctuary to the fugitive Cetshwayo at his Bangonomo homestead. Although the king did not take up the offer himself, he did send his eleven-year-old son, Dinuzulu, into Zibhebhu's care, along with many of the royal women and 100 head of cattle. This incident, as a result of the British settlement, is believed by some to have apparently provoked the quarrel with the royal family that was to have such a devastating effect on the kingdom's subsequent history.

Acknowledgements.

Only documents and works which have been referred to, or which have been directly material to the writing of this project, have been listed below.

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